

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

Executive Secretary/State

Per our conversation, will you please see
that this envelope from Mr. Bush to the
Secretary is delivered to him promptly.



BCEvans
Executive Secretary
CIA

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3
Date 18 November 1976

STAT

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

FROM THE DESK OF
THE DIRECTOR

Nov. 18

Henry —

Here is a
brief shot at
what we will
be giving the
pres-elect on
Friday. If you
need more detail
let me know —
ag/

OUTLINE FOR BRIEFING PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER

- I. In-depth Briefing (outline attached)
 - A. International Oil
 - B. Arab States-Israel
- II. Other Important Recent Developments (text attached)
 - A. Soviet view of the Carter Administration
 - B. Strategic forces update
 - C. SALT compliance
 - D. Debate on Soviet objectives
- III. Other Current Developments (no text - will be briefed as in recent PDBs)
 - A. Southern Africa
 - B. Horn of Africa
 - C. Poland
 - D. Sino-Soviet relations post-Mao

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

18 November 1976

President-Elect Carter Briefing
November 1976

INTERNATIONAL OIL

- I. The Current Situation
 - A. The Middle East
 - B. The Upcoming Decision on Oil Prices
 - C. The Impact of a 10 Percent Price Rise
- II. The Longer Term
 - A. Future Trends in Oil Prices
 - B. Importance of the Arab States
 - C. Strength of the Arab Oil Weapon
- III. Free World Dependence on OPEC oil
 - A. New Non-OPEC Oil Sources
 - B. Magnitude of Future Dependence
 - C. The US
 - D. Other Major Free World Countries

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

SECRET

SENSITIVE

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

VI. THE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN EMBROILMENT

VII. IF WAR COMES AGAIN

A. The Situation in 1976

B. The Projected Military Balance to 1981

VIII. THE SOVIET FACTOR

A. Origins of Soviet Policy

B. Soviet Policy on Arab-Israeli Confrontation

C. Impact of 1973 War

D. Current Soviet Posture

E. Soviet Prospects

IX. OUTLOOK

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

17 November 1976

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3
~~President-Elect Carter Briefing~~
November 1976

THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

I. The Soviets anticipate no major change in the direction of US foreign policy under President Carter.

A. Some of your campaign statements have given them pause. For example:

your reference to using economic leverage in cases of Soviet adventures like Angola,

your assertion that a Carter administration would make sure that detente was a two-way street.

B. Still, they are inclined to pass this off as normal campaign rhetoric, and they have taken note of your repeated commitment to the detente process.

1. They have also noted favorably--and this point was reinforced by Governor Harriman in his talks with Brezhnev--that you refrained from direct criticism of the SALT negotiations.

2. They have seen no significant differences between you and President Ford on US relations with China.

C. While Moscow anticipates continuity in fundamentals, it expects some differences in style, methods of operating, and interests.

1. Because of your connection with the Trilateral Commission, Moscow anticipates greater attention

to US relations with Japan and Western Europe.

2. It also anticipates more interest in such humanitarian issues as Jewish emigration from the USSR and Basket III of the Helsinki accords. This worries the Soviets.
3. The Soviets believe that you will put more of a personal stamp on the conduct of US policy than did your predecessor. This is likely to increase Brezhnev's desire to have an early meeting with the new President.

II. The Soviets will want to get relations with the new administration off to a good start.

A. They are likely to heed Governor Harriman's advice to avoid bellicose or "testing" gestures such as Khrushchev indulged in January 1961.

1. Brezhnev's plenum speech last month is one good sign that Moscow's first inclination is to get the US relationship back on track after the setbacks and, from its perspective, disappointments of the past two years.
2. The fluid situation in China reinforces this inclination.
 - a. For Moscow, one of the prime purposes of a detente relationship with Washington is precisely to limit the Sino-US rapprochement.

b. If the new Peking leaders continue to
Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3
rebuff Soviet overtures and lean toward

Washington, Moscow will have extra
incentive to make up lost ground with
the US.

B. Moscow's desire for more economic interchange with
the US, and access to US technology and scientific
expertise, is undiminished.

1. The failure to get most-favored-nation status
still smarts. The Soviets will now want to
see whether something can be worked out with
a Democratic President and a Democratic congress.
2. They may well take some steps with respect to
Jewish emigration to smooth the way.

C. But the key issue, of course, is arms and arms
control.

1. For the Soviets, your most intriguing statements
doubtless have been those on the US defense
budget, the B-1, and SALT. They will surely
make some noises designed to encourage a negative
decision on the B-1.
2. They will also want to test whether your Adminis-
tration will accept their last formulation on
Backfire and cruise missiles.

a. But we have one report that the Soviet
negotiators have a fallback position on these
issues that they have been saving until after

SOV VIEW - 3

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

3. The Soviets may also want to do something to revive the MBFR negotiations, and they are likely to respond to your own expressed interest in limiting nuclear proliferation.

D. The Soviets are likely to put pressure on you fairly quickly for concrete steps in Soviet-US relations.

Moscow will want:

1. to tie your administration to the detente approach,
2. to get in ahead of the Chinese,
3. and to demonstrate to others, particularly our allies, the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP79M00467A003100120011-3

17 November 1976

President-Elect
Carter Briefing
November 1976

The Debate Over Soviet Strategic Objectives

I. A debate has been building up in Washington over the past year about Soviet strategic objectives. I'm sure you've heard loud echoes of it here in Plains.

A. The essence of this debate is an effort to define how farreaching Soviet strategic objectives are. To put the question bluntly:

Do the Soviets now base practical policy on a belief that, within some finite period, the USSR will become the world's strongest single power?

II. This question has become acute for both objective and subjective reasons.

A. Objectively, it has become clear to all that the USSR's detente policy does not exclude -- in fact it presupposes -- continued struggle between two world systems.

B. More ominously, the USSR's military buildup continues unabated, despite its achievement of strategic parity and the advent of arms control negotiations.

III. On the subjective side, I think it's fair to say that the debaters' views are colored by their feelings about their own country -- specifically, whether the US, wounded by Vietnam and Watergate, can stay the course in a vigorous competition.

IV. It is important to be clear about some important propositions that are not in dispute.

A. The USSR remains an expansionist power. Its foreign policy does not aim at stability. Its military policy does not aim at equilibrium. It pursues advantage in each arena, and sees a close relationship between the two.

B. To elaborate on the military aspect, the Soviets do not accept the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which asserts that it is desirable, for the sake of stability, that each side should be vulnerable to a devastating second strike.

- V. They acknowledge, of course, that this condition is a fact of life today.
- A. But their military doctrine calls for building capabilities not simply to deter, but to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war.
- B. As to whether the Soviets can ever reach such a position, that depends heavily on how US forces develop. But they are working in that direction, as is evident in their programs for air defense, their ABM research efforts, their extensive hardening of command facilities, and their ongoing civil defense program.
- VI. These efforts in the strategic field are accompanied by a steady, ~~the uneven~~ modernization of other forces. This proceeds at a moderate rate in the Soviet navy and a more vigorous rate in the forces facing NATO, where the USSR is equipping itself to be ready to fight with little or no advance warning and to conduct limited nuclear warfare.

VII. There is general agreement on the evidence lying behind these statements. When we come to Soviet military research and development, however, there is simply much less evidence, since this activity is conducted inside secret laboratories.

A. Such evidence as we do have leads some to believe that the USSR is not on the threshold of some major breakthrough that would alter the strategic balance, and that the US remains well ahead in military technology.

B. Others, however, believe that Soviet breakthroughs are likely in such areas as directed-energy weapons.

VIII. There is substantial argument about how the Soviet leaders view the US as a long-run competitor.

A. Some think that Moscow, viewing US domestic travails and alliance problems, has passed its zenith as a world power and has begun a permanent decline.

B. Others stress Soviet respect for US economic and technological strength and for its present potential military power. They see little sign that the Soviets count on an American

decline. (Note: this view is supported by sensitive sources which, unfortunately, cannot be shared outside a small circle.)

- IX. The argument eventually focusses on Soviet risk taking and crisis behavior.
- A. No one believes that the Soviet leaders are gamblers. They habitually advance only when they judge the chance of success to be high, and when they also can see a line of retreat if necessary.
- B. The argument is rather over whether their calculations of risk are changing, or will soon.
- X. Some believe that the Soviet leaders, viewing their own gains and the losses on the Western side, are recalculating risks downward.
- A. In this view, Moscow sees the US as unsure of itself and increasingly deterred by growing Soviet strategic power from standing up to the USSR. By this calculation, any particular Soviet advance or challenge -- whether deliberately undertaken or arising out of some regional crisis -- carries less risk than

previously. The Angolan venture typifies this outlook, and we can expect such enterprises to increase in number as the Soviets judge that they are able to practice coercion and blackmail.

XI. Others think this goes too far, that while the Soviets would surely like to achieve such an advantageous position, they do not really expect to do so within the next decade. This reading gives greater stress to Soviet disabilities -- in their economy and in their conflict with China -- and to Soviet respect for US technology and military power. It expects Soviet policy to be aggressive, but to be guided by a long view stressing a patient approach. It doubts that the Soviets are now recalculating risks downwards and expects Moscow to take each crisis as it comes.

XII. That, sir, is a sketch of the current debate about Soviet strategic objectives. I'm not sure how relevant it is to the problems you will face.

A. Back in 1951, Ambassador Bohlen sought to end a similar debate with the proposition that,

even though Soviet strategic objectives were difficult to define, the USSR was a powerful state and a hostile state, and that was really enough to know in making our own policy.

DEBATE - 7

SECRET